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Criminal Law
by Laura D. Hogue*
and Franklin J. Hogue*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this year's survey of criminal law in Georgia, we selected only cases
in which a new rule of law was announced, a case of first impression was
presented, a case with unusual or interesting facts was presented, or the
case, while saying nothing new, set forth well-established law about
topics that we could all use a reminder of from time to time.
II.
A.

PRETRIAL ISSUES

Speedy Trial

When a motion for speedy trial is filed pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,' and a motion to dismiss
alleging a speedy trial violation is subsequently filed, the trial court
must enter findings of fact and conclusions of law setting forth its
analysis pursuant to Barker v. Wingo.2 The court must conduct the
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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four-step Barker v. Wingo analysis' and must enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law consistent with that opinion. If the court does not do
so, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Bryant v. State4 and Smith v.
6
State,' and the Georgia Supreme Court held in Williams v. State, that
the denial of the motions to dismiss will be remanded to the trial court
to conduct this essential analysis.
In two instances, the State of Georgia appealed trial court orders
granting statutory speedy trial discharges,' and in both State v.
Shields8 and State v. Edminson,9 defendants prevailed, having sufficiently shown that discharge and acquittal were required for failure to
try defendants during the time required by the statutory speedy trial
demand. 1
B.

Double Jeopardy

If a mistrial is declared over the defendant's objection, the defendant
cannot be retried unless it can be shown that the mistrial was manifestly necessary. In Payne v. State," defendant was charged with various
sexual offenses against his stepdaughter, who, after accusing him,
recanted to a Department of Family and Children Services ("DFCS")
caseworker. The stepdaughter explained she had accused Payne because
she was angry at him for disciplining her, and she acquired knowledge
of the sex acts she accused Payne of having committed upon her by
viewing pornography at her father's home. The State moved to prohibit
any evidence that the child had viewed pornography as violative of the
Rape Shield Statute.'" The motion was granted."3
At trial defense counsel cross-examined the State's DFCS worker and
elicited testimony that the child had recanted.' 4 When defense counsel
examined her further to elicit the child's explanation for having lied
about Payne, the DFCS worker explained that the child "stated that she

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
91-92,
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 530.
265 Ga. App. 234, 593 S.E.2d 705 (2004).
266 Ga. App. 529, 597 S.E.2d 414 (2004).
277 Ga. 598, 592 S.E.2d 848 (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 (2003).
265 Ga. App. 473, 594 S.E.2d 692 (2004).
265-Ga. App. 91, 593 S.E.2d 18 (2004).
Shields, 265 Ga. App. at 473-74, 594 S.E.2d at 692-93; Edminson, 265 Ga. App. at
593 S.E.2d at 18-19.
267 Ga. App. 498, 600 S.E.2d 422 (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (2003).
Payne, 267 Ga. App. at 499, 600 S.E.2d at 423.
Id.
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had seen a pornographic movie." 5 Defense counsel tried to stay within
the parameters of the pretrial ruling by questioning the witness about
the child's anger at having been disciplined by Payne; however, on recross, defense counsel became concerned that the unresponsive answer
concerning pornography could lead the jury to conclude that Payne had
been the one to show the child the pornography. Because of this
concern, defense counsel returned to the subject and was immediately
silenced by the prosecutor, who objected and moved for a mistrial. The
defense's objection, which was raised in a
motion was granted over
16
motion to bar a retrial.
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that defense counsel did not ask
any question that would reasonably have led the DFCS worker to testify
about the pornography. 7 Moreover, the court concluded that once the
witness testified, it was important for defense counsel to make certain
that the jury did not impute to his client the alleged victim's viewing of
the pornographic images.'" That being the case, there was no "manifest
necessity for the declaration of a mistrial without Payne's consent." 9
Thus, the trial court erred in denying defendant's plea of former
jeopardy.2"
C.

Statute of Limitations

The court of appeals, in Tompkins v. State," addressed the complexities of assessing the proper statute of limitations for cases concerning
crimes against minors." First, in Tompkins the court established the
rule that the seven-year limitation period for noncapital felonies
committed against children under the age of fourteen is a general
statute of limitations, not an exception to the four-year statute of
limitations that applies to noncapital felonies committed against children
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. 2' The importance of this
ruling is that any exception to the statute of limitations must be pleaded
in the indictment in order for the State to rely upon it. If the seven-year
statute of limitations is an exception to the four-year statute of
limitations, the State would be required to plead in the indictment that

15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 499-500, 600 S.E.2d at 423-24.
Id.

18. Id.

19. Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
265 Ga. App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 599 (2004).
Id. at 760, 595 S.E.2d at 599.
O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1(c) (2003).
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the child was under fourteen in order to proceed with the seven-year,
versus the four-year, limitations period.24 In Grizzard v. State,25 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that in order for the State to rely upon
the seven-year limitations period, it must allege in the indictment, and
prove, that the victim was under the age of fourteen. 26 The holding
assumes that the seven-year period is an exception to the four-year
limitations period.
The opinion in Tompkins disapproves of the holding in Grizzard. The
court in Tompkins held that the seven-year limitations period is a
general limitations period, not an exception to the four-year statute of
limitations; therefore, it is not necessary for the State to plead age in the
indictment to try and utilize the lengthier limitations period.2

1

Of

course either period of limitations is tolled when the indictment alleges
that the victim is under the age of sixteen until the time that the child
reaches the age of sixteen.28
D. Demurrers: Sufficiency and Constitutionality of the Charging
Documents
Two Georgia statutes 29 were declared unconstitutional by the Georgia
Supreme Court during this reporting period. First, in Cooper v. State,"0
the constitutionality of the implied consent statute31 was challenged.
The implied consent statute authorized the seizure of blood from any
driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that resulted in serious bodily
injury or death.3 2 Because the statute did not require any determination of whether probable cause existed to suspect the driver committed
any crime, the statute violated state"3 and federal' constitutions and
was declared unconstitutional.3 5
Second, in Mohamed v. State, 6 the Georgia Supreme Court declared
a section of the financial transaction card fraud statute3 7 unconstitu-

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Moss v. State, 220 Ga. App. 150, 469 S.E.2d 325 (1996).
258 Ga. App. 124, 572 S.E.2d 760 (2002).
Id. at 127, 572 S.E.2d at 763.
265 Ga. App. at 765, 595 S.E.2d at 603.
O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1 (2003).
Id.; O.C.G.A_ § 16-9-31(d) (2003).
277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1.
Cooper, 277 Ga. at 282, 587 S.E.2d at 606-07 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1).
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 13.
U.S. CONST. amends. IV & XIV.
Cooper, 277 Ga. at 283, 587 S.E.2d at 607.
276 Ga. 706, 583 S.E.2d 9 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(d) (2003).
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tional. 3" The financial transaction card fraud statute provided that
possession of two or more financial transaction cards, in the names of
persons other than the suspect or his immediate family, would "be
prima-facie evidence that the financial transaction cards" had been
criminally obtained.39 The court held that this mandatory presumption
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that
he did not criminally obtain the cards.4 ° Mohamed's defense was that
he found the cards on the ground; yet, the burden-shifting permitted by
the statute undermined that defense and effectively eliminated the other
sections of the financial transaction card fraud statute that established
other elements of proof necessary for the crime. Therefore, the burdenshifting language of that statute was unconstitutional.4 1
In State v. Langlands,42 the State waged an unsuccessful challenge
to a trial court's decision to grant a demurrer on two counts of the
indictment against Langlands. Defendant was charged with possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder. The predicate
felony for the firearm offense was a 1985 conviction in Pennsylvania for
involuntary manslaughter, and the predicate felony for the felony
murder offense was the possession of a firearm. Under Pennsylvania
law4 3 involuntary manslaughter was categorized as a misdemeanor, but

it carried a maximum sentence of five years. 4 The Georgia Supreme
Court determined that the trial court was correct in finding that
Georgia's felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute45 failed to provide
"sufficient notice to persons with out-of-state misdemeanor convictions
that their convictions may serve as predicate felony offenses" for the
crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.'
There were several other instances where the appellate courts
identified fatal errors in indictments that were sufficient to support the
granting of general and special demurrers. Through its rulings the
appellate court reminds prosecutors that it is imperative to plead every
essential element of the crime in the indictment because "there can be
'no conviction for the commission of a crime[,] an essential element of

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

276 Ga. at 709, 583 S.E.2d at 12.
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(d).
Mohamed, 276 Ga. at 708, 583 S.E.2d at 12.
Id. at 707-08, 583 S.E.2d at 11.
276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (2003).
18 PA. C.S.A. § 2504 (2004).
Langlands, 276 Ga. at 722, 583 S.E.2d at 20.
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 (2003).
Langlands, 276 Ga. at 724, 583 S.E.2d at 21.
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In Spence v. State,4 the

court of appeals held that the indictment, which charged Spence with
the crime of fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer, merely
recited a description of the statute along with some, but not all, of the
elements of the offense, which rendered the indictment fatally deficient.49 The fleeing and eluding statute" provides that it is
unlawful for any driver of a vehicle willfully to fail or refuse to bring
his or her vehicle to a stop or otherwise to flee or attempt to elude a
pursuing police vehicle or police officer when given a visual or an
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.5
The court of appeals held that the indictment was fatally defective
because it failed to allege: (1) that Spence intended to elude the police
when he failed to stop his car; (2) which signals Spence ignored (visual
or audible); and (3) which signals were given by the police.5"
In State v. Burrell,53 the court of appeals both affirmed and reversed
a trial court determination concerning multiple charges of aggressive
driving and reckless driving, all arising out of the same incident.5 4
After being cut off in traffic by the driver of an Acura, Burrell chased the
car at a high rate of speed and in a reckless manner. The incident
ended in a collision. Burrell was charged with four counts of aggressive
driving 5 and four counts of reckless driving;"S each of the four counts

differed only by naming the four occupants of the Acura. 7 The trial
court sustained the demurrer, finding that both offenses related to the
conduct of defendant driver and not to his intent toward the driver or
occupant of the other car; therefore, there could be only one charge of
each offense arising out of Burrell's conduct.5" The appellate court
agreed with that rationale as it applied to the charge of reckless driving
but disagreed that the argument applied to the aggressive driving

47. Spence v. State, 263 Ga. App. 25, 27, 587 S.E.2d 183, 185 (2003) (quoting Smith v.
Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55, 464 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1995)).
48. 263 Ga. App. 25, 587 S.E.2d 183 (2003).
49. Id. at 28, 587 S.E.2d at 186.
50. O.C.GA. § 40-6-395(a) (2003).
51. Id.
52. Spence, 263 Ga. App. at 27-28, 587 S.E.2d at 186.
53. 263 Ga. App. 207, 587 S.E.2d 298 (2003).
54. Id. at 209, 587 S.E.2d at 300.
55. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-397 (2003) (a relatively new statute aimed at the problem of "road
rage"); Burrell, 263 Ga. App. at 207, 587 S.E.2d at 299.
56. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390 (2002); Burrell, 263 Ga. App. at 207, 587 S.E.2d at 299.
57. Burrell, 263 Ga. App. at 207-08, 587 S.E.2d at 298-99.
58. Id. at 207, 587 S.E.2d at 299.
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statute.59 As the road rage statute60 states, "A person commits the
offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle
with the intent to annoy, harass, molest, intimidate, injure, or obstruct
another person. " 6' The legislature chose not to limit the potential
victim to just the car or the driver but to any or all of the occupants of
the car being pursued, if the State can show the requisite intent as it
62
Therefore,
relates to any specific person named in the indictment.
Burrell's indictment, which charged four counts of aggressive driving
that arose out of the same car chase, could stand.6"
Causation is always a necessary element of the offense and must be
pleaded in the indictment. In Scraders v. State," the State indicted
defendant for involuntary manslaughter with a misdemeanor offense of
possession of a firearm by a person under the age of eighteen. However,
the indictment failed to allege the causation between Scraders's illegal
possession of the gun and the death of the victim. Because defendant
could have admitted to being a minor in possession of a gun, along with
an admission that he unintentionally caused the victim's death,
defendant could not be convicted of the offense of involuntary manslaughter because no act-such as pointing the gun at the victim or
acting recklessly with the firearm-was alleged in the indictment.'
Likewise, the charging document must also set forth every essential
element of the offense, including the predicate acts that form the basis
for the offense charged. Failure to do so deprives the accused of due
process because it fails to inform him of the nature of the offense to
sufficiently enable him to prepare his defense. This is the case for all
charging documents, including the insufficient juvenile delinquency
petition used in In the Interest of E.S., A Child.66 The juvenile petition
charging E.S. with violation of the Street Gang Act 6' simply recited
that the juvenile violated the statute "by engaging in a pattern of
criminal gang activity"6 without describing any of the acts he allegedly
performed.69

59. Id. at 208, 587 S.E.2d at 300.
60. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-397 (2003).
61. Id.
62. Burrell, 263 Ga. App. at 208-09, 587 S.E.2d at 300.
63. Id. at 209, 587 S.E.2d at 300.
64. 263 Ga. App. 754, 589 S.E.2d 315 (2003).
65. Id. at 754-55, 589 S.E.2d at 315-16.
66. 262 Ga. App. 768, 586 S.E.2d 691 (2003).
67. O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4 (2003).
68. In the Interest of E.S., 262 Ga. App. at 769, 586 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 16-15-4).
69. Id. at 769-70, 586 S.E.2d at 692-93.
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The indictment must also name the victim so that the defendant is
given notice of the person whom he is alleged to have injured. The
practice of referring to child victims in charging documents by initials
only came under scrutiny this reporting period. In Sellers v. State,7 °
defendant was indicted for child molestation, but the indictment listed
the name of the victim by initials only.7" The court of appeals recognized that the longstanding practice of naming child victims by initials
only was to protect the child's privacy and noted that it is the practice
of the appellate courts to refer to children by initials in the court
opinions.72 Yet the court held that the impulse to protect the minor's
identity must give way to the more important constitutional considerations that require the defendant be properly notified in the charging
document of the name of his accuser.7"
E.

Search and Seizure
A legitimate need exists for law enforcement, on occasion, to stop or
"seize" a person. Such a seizure should be brief. A person stopped may
be frisked, which means patting down the outer clothing for the presence
of weapons. Both the stop and the frisk must be based upon specific
facts that the officer can articulate, along with reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts, which when judged against an objective
standard-what a reasonable person would think-would justify the stop
and the frisk.7 4 The stop must be based upon a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, but the frisk must be based upon a reasonable
suspicion that the person stopped may be armed.75
The legal issues that surround such a police-citizen encounter involve
the circumstances that justify the initial stop, the scope of the officer's
contact with the citizen after making the stop, and the lawful response
a citizen may give to this restraint upon his movement. With respect to
the latter issue, a Georgia citizen may refuse to identify himself to police
and simply walk away, unless the police officer makes the request in the
"lawful discharge of his official duties."76 "Lawful discharge" means

70. 263 Ga. App. 144, 587 S.E.2d 276 (2003).
71. Id. at 144, 587 S.E.2d at 277.
72. Id. at 145, 587 S.E.2d at 277.
73. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 278. The holding is specifically limited to pretrial demurrers.
In the event that this issue is raised after a trial, it would be necessary to prove that the
defendant did not, in fact, know the identity of the victim identified only by initials. Id.
at 146, 587 S.E.2d at 278.
74. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Slocum v. State, 267 Ga. App. 337, 337, 599
S.E.2d 299, 300 (2004).
75. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
76. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 (2003).

2004]

CRIMINAL LAW

161

that, while on duty, a "police officer may make a momentary detention
and investigation based upon specific and articulable facts, which must
exceed mere inclination, caprice, or harassment."vv However, the
citizen's decision that the officer does not possess any specific, articulable
fact that would support a suspicion of criminal activity, thereby
justifying the citizen's refusal to stop or provide identification, is fraught
with peril.78 Instances in which a citizen refuses to comply with an
officer and the officer fails to charge the citizen with a crime are those
cases that never reach a courtroom. Only when a stop, search, arrest,
and prosecution occur do we actually find a reported case.
Georgia recognizes three tiers of police-citizen encounters: (1)
"communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or
detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment";
(2) "brief 'seizures' that must be supported by reasonable suspicion"; and
(3) "full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause."7 9
In the first level, police officers may approach citizens, ask for
identification, and freely question the citizen without any basis or
belief that the citizen is involved in criminal activity, as long as the
officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the
citizen may not leave.'
In White v. State,"' two police officers, Branham and Moye, drove
onto "residential property where individuals performed automotive work
for the general public."82 White was in the yard of this house, which
was in a known drug area, and he offered to wash and wax the officers'
car.8 3 The court recounts what then ensued:
Moye declined the offer and walked away. White, however, repeated
his offer to Branham. While White was speaking, Branham noticed

77. Smith v. State, 262 Ga. App. 614, 617, 585 S.E.2d 888, 892 (2003).
78. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004)
(holding that neither Mr. Hiibel's Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights were violated upon
his conviction under Nevada's "stop and identify" statute when he refused to identify
himself to police officers). See Clark v. State, 243 Ga. App. 362, 365, 532 S.E.2d 481, 484
(2000) ("merely refusing to identify oneself to a police officer is not a crime, [but] one may
commit obstruction when knowingly and willfully hindering an officer in investigating an
offense committed by another.").
79. Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233, 234, 303 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1983). See White
v. State, 267 Ga. App. 200, 598 S.E.2d 904 (2004); Peters v. State, 242 Ga. App. 816, 817,
531 S.E.2d 386, 387-88 (2000); McAdoo v. State, 164 Ga. App. 23, 295 S.E. 114 (1982).
80. White, 267 Ga. App. at 201, 598 S.E.2d at 906-07.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 200, 598 S.E.2d at 906.
83. Id.
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that White's left thumb and index finger were pinched together as if he
were hiding something. White's behavior prompted Branham to
inquire whether White had any drugs. White responded that he had
"a nick weed," which is street language for a small amount of marijua4
na.8
Until White claimed he was holding marijuana, he was, according to
Branham, free to walk away and not answer any of Branham's
questions. White, up to the point of his admission, was engaged in a tier
one encounter with Officer Branham." The encounter escalated to a
tier two when, "[flearing that White would try to get rid of the drugs,
Branham grabbed White's hand, and White dropped a piece of crack
cocaine onto the ground."86 White's statement gave Branham reasonable suspicion to suspect that White was involved in criminal activity.
The encounter then quickly moved to tier three when Branham arrested
White for possession of illegal drugs. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's denial of White's motion to suppress the evidence seized
from him.8
In some cases the police-citizen encounter begins at tier two, descends
to tier one, then jumps back to tier two, and then ends with a tier three
arrest. Consider Daniel v. State88 where Officer Ryals stopped Daniel
for weaving out of his lane of traffic. Two other people were in the car
with Daniel. Daniel gave a false name to the officer and claimed not to
have any identification on him. Dawson, a front seat passenger, gave
the officer his driver's license. Ryals left Daniel and Dawson in their
car, returned to his patrol car, and ran a license check on the fake name
Daniels had given him and on Dawson's license; he found both names to
belong to licensed drivers. Ryals then issued Daniel a warning citation.
Because Daniel did not have a driver's license on him, Ryals told him
that he would have to let Dawson drive, but that they were free to leave.
At this point, the tier two encounter-a brief seizure based upon the
officer's observation of weaving-ended.8 9 When Daniel was about to
get into the passenger side of his car to let Dawson drive away, Ryals
asked: "Do you mind if I ask a question?" This was a tier one encounter
to which Daniel could have responded by answering the question, or
saying nothing at all, getting in his car, and leaving. But Daniel
answered "sure." Ryals then told Daniel he was free to leave, but that

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 202, 598 S.E.2d at 907.

88. 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

89. Id. at 847-48, 597 S.E.2d at 123-24.
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he would like to talk to him. Daniel said nothing in response but
continued to stand next to his car. In a manner now familiar to all who
prosecute or defend traffic stop cases, Ryals proceeded to tell Daniel
about the problems with narcotics coming into the area and then asked
Daniel whether it would be alright for him to search his car. Daniel
consented. Drugs were found on Daniel and in his car. Ryals then
moved to tier three and arrested Daniel.'
Frisking a citizen for weapons often turns into a search for other
evidence of a crime. In Cartwright v. State,9 police officers responded
to a complaint that Cartwright and her husband, Grant, were arguing
with their neighbors over how fast the neighbors' son was driving his car
through the neighborhood. The neighbors told the officers that either
Cartwright or Grant had threatened to shoot out the tires on the kid's
car. The officers then walked across the street to talk to Cartwright and
Grant. Grant said he had a gun but would not use it, while Cartwright
warned that if the kid came back she would shoot out his tires. The
officers then patted the couple down for weapons.92
While patting down Cartwright, the officer felt something hard in
Cartwright's front pocket. The officer removed it; it was a magazine clip
containing bullets. The officer returned to the pat-down and felt another
hard object, this time in Cartwright's back pocket. When the officer
removed the object, she saw it was a small wooden box. She opened it,
only to find that it contained marijuana. The officer arrested Cart93
wright.
On appeal from the trial court's denial of Cartwright's motion to
suppress, the court of appeals reversed, holding that opening the box
A
exceeded the scope of the officer's lawful pat-down for weapons.'
pat-down is a search limited to weapons and is authorized only when the
officer has a reasonable belief that the person is armed and dangerous.95 In this instance the officer did possess such a reasonable belief
because Cartwright was agitated and threatened to shoot out someone's
tires. The search went wrong, however, when the officer opened the box,
not because she thought it contained a weapon, which she did not, but
because, as she testified, she thought it contained marijuana. Even if
the officer had thought the box contained a weapon, she still could not

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 848, 597 S.E.2d at 124.
265 Ga. App. 520, 594 S.E.2d 723 (2004).
Id. at 520, 594 S.E.2d at 723.
Id.
Id. at 522, 594 S.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 521, 594 S.E.2d at 724.
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have opened the box because the purpose of the pat-down had been
accomplished when she removed the box from Cartwright.96
To illustrate how thinly the courts slice these pat-down cases, note the
distinction between Cartwright and Davis v. State. 7 In Davis the
"officer was justified in opening a cigarette box found in the [defendant's]
pocket because the officer testified that he believed the box might
contain 'a razor blade, needle, or other small weapon."'9 8 In fact it
contained marijuana, but that search was upheld, even though, as in
Cartwright,the officer had removed the possible weapon from Davis and,
therefore, had accomplished the purpose of the pat-down.9 9 Note that
the entire difference between the two cases appears to be the testimony
of the respective police officers about what they believed to be in the
boxes when they opened them.
In yet another cigarette box pat-down case, the State unsuccessfully
sought to reverse the trial court's suppression of methamphetamine that
a Department of Natural Resources ranger found on a hunter."° In
State v. Jourdan,0 ' the ranger testified that he knew the box could
contain a small weapon, but he did not think that it did. 0 2 That
°3
and unlike
makes the case, and the outcome, much like Cartwright"
The
of
consent.
issue
the
additional
raises
But
Jourdan
Davis."
ranger asked Jourdan to climb down from a deer stand, after which the
ranger asked Jourdan whether he had any weapons and if he would
consent to a search, which Jourdan did. The ranger checked Jourdan's
pockets, found no weapons, then asked Jourdan to remove his coveralls,
which he did. The ranger felt a cigarette box in Jourdan's shirt pocket
and requested that Jourdan hand it to him, which he did. The ranger
opened the box and found the methamphetamine.0 °
In addition to its argument that the seizure was lawful because the
pat-down was lawful, the State argued that the search of the cigarette
box was lawful because Jourdan had given consent. °6 However, both
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97.
98.
App. at
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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232 Ga. App. 450, 501 S.E.2d 241 (1998).
Cartwright,265 Ga. App. at 520, 594 S.E.2d at 724-25 (quoting Davis, 232 Ga.
451, 501 S.E.2d at 244).
Davis, 232 Ga. App. at 451, 501 S.E.2d at 243-44.
State v. Jourdan, 264 Ga. App. 118, 589 S.E.2d 682 (2003).
264 Ga. App. 118, 589 S.E.2d 682 (2003).
Id. at 120, 589 S.E.2d at 685.
Cartwright,265 Ga. App. at 520, 594 S.E.2d at 723.
Davis, 232 Ga. App. at 450, 501 S.E.2d at 241.
Jourdan,264 Ga. App. at 119, 589 S.E.2d at 684.
Id., 589 S.E.2d at 684-85.
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the trial court and appellate court disagreed. °7 The court of appeals
held: "While Jourdan apparently acquiesced to the officer's directive to
give him the cigarette box, we cannot say that single factor demonstrat"
ed free consent or showed that Jourdan felt free to refuse to do so. 108
Again, to illustrate how thin the factual differences can be between cases
that produce diametrically opposite results, the court distinguished
Morris v. State"° from Jourdan by noting that in Morris the officer
asked Morris if he would mind if the officer examined a box of matches
he had seized from him, to which Morris responded by saying, "no, go
ahead.""0 Those three little words from Morris gave the consent that
Jourdan failed to give by merely handing over the cigarette pack when
directed to do so by the ranger.
If, during a pat-down for weapons, an officer feels something that he
or she knows is not a weapon, but feels like "an object whose contours
and mass makes [sic] it immediately identifiable as contraband, that
officer can seize the item.""' Such a tactile experience by the officer
increases the officer's belief from a reasonable suspicion that the person
being searched may be armed to probable cause that the person is
committing a crime. This standard was initially set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in 1993, when the Court established what has
come to be known as the "plain feel doctrine."" 2 In Henderson v.
State," the court affirmed the suppression of the officer's seizure of
a plastic bag containing drugs found in Henderson's coin pocket, felt
during a lawful pat-down, because there was nothing about the baggie
that would immediately distinguish it from a legal substance, such as
"sweetener or headache powder," and the officer failed to articulate any
distinction.""
Like all search and seizure cases, the slight factual differences
between pat-down cases make all the difference in their outcomes. Now
compare the result in Henderson to Bianco v. State,"5 in which the
court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress when a sixteen-year
police veteran testified that the object he felt in defendant's pocket felt

107. Id. at 123, 589 S.E.2d at 687.
108. Id. at 121, 589 S.E.2d at 685-86.
109. 239 Ga. App. 100, 520 S.E.2d 485 (1999).
110. Jourdan, 264 Ga. App. at 121, 589 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Morris, 239 Ga. App.
at 101, 520 S.E.2d at 488).
111. State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 883, 589 S.E.2d 647, 649 (2003) (quoting
Patman v. State, 244 Ga. App. 833, 834, 537 S.E. 118, 120 (2000)).
112. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 365, 377 (1993).
113. 263 Ga. App. 880, 589 S.E.2d 647 (2003).
114. Id. at 882, 589 S.E.2d at 648.
115. 257 Ga. App. 289, 570 S.E.2d 605 (2002).
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to him like a "corner baggie," commonly used in street drug sales." 6
The officer in Henderson, it should be noted, testified that he had no
doubt that what he felt in Henderson's pocket was contraband. He could
tell it was a plastic bag, he knew that drugs were frequently stored in
plastic bags, and he knew that the coin pocket was a favorite place for
people to hide drugs. But the officer in Henderson only had two-and-ahalf years experience in drug interdiction as opposed to the sixteen years
experience of the officer in Bianco.17 More importantly, however, in
Bianco,"8 as well as in Seaman v. State,"9 a case in which the officer felt a plastic bag in defendant's pocket, believed it contained
contraband, and could see a portion of the bag protruding from the
defendant's pocket, the trial courts denied the motions to suppress;
however, in Henderson the trial court granted the motion. 2 ° The trial
courts' decisions mattered to the appellate court because "[i]n these
cases, which are very 'fact specific,' the decision of the trial judge, sitting
as the trier of fact, should be accorded considerable deference when his
or her decision falls within the broad outlines of the guidance provided
by the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson."'2 '
In Burrell v. State,'22 Officer Pickens stopped a car one December
night because it did not have a "properly affixed license plate."'2 The
driver was arrested after a driver's license check because he had
outstanding warrants. Two additional officers, Reddy and Brewer,
arrived as backup. The driver asked Pickens if his buddy, front seat
passenger Samuel Burrell, could drive his car to avoid having it
impounded. Reddy approached Burrell to verify that he had a valid
license. Reddy ran a license check on Burrell, which resulted in a
problem with Burrell's license; the name Burrell gave did not match the
license number. Pickens took the license from Reddy to run a second
check. While running the check from inside his police car, Pickens
noticed that Reddy was conducting a pat-down of Burrell. Reddy found
a knife and a martial arts weapon. Pickens and Brewer then confronted
Burrell with the fake name problem, and Burrell admitted to using a
false name because he had outstanding warrants as well. The officers
arrested Burrell, but when Pickens detected a gun on Burrell, Burrell
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because the officers
attempted to flee. He did not get very far, however, 124
possession.
his
in
gun
the
secured
and
him
tackled
At the suppression hearing, Reddy never testified. At the hearing,
Pickens admitted he had never had a conversation with Burrell until
after he conducted the second license check. Thus, Pickens did not know
what transpired between Reddy and Burrell regarding the driver's
request to allow Burrell to take the car. Therefore, Pickens did not
know whether the encounter between Reddy and Burrell was in fact a
tier one encounter. Because the State failed to provide evidence to show
why Burrell's license was being checked, the State failed to meet its
and Burrell
burden of proving that the encounter between the officers
125
suppressed.
be
to
had
evidence
the
thus,
was lawful;
In reviewing a motion to suppress, the appellate court will affirm the
trial court's findings of disputed facts, unless clearly erroneous, and will
126
In Moore
review its application of law to undisputed facts de novo.
27
a.m. to
3:00
around
center
travel
at
a
v. State, two deputies stopped
a
suspicious
out
check
to
them
asked
clerk
get something to eat, and a
car in the rear lot where the large trucks refueled. When the deputies
saw the car pull away, one of them pursued the driver, Moore, and
stopped him. This deputy, Mobley, smelled alcohol, saw that Moore's
eyes were bloodshot, and noticed he was unsteady on his feet. Moore
admitted that he had been drinking; his breath test results read

0.180.128
If the officer made the traffic stop based upon some particular
suspicion of criminal activity, rather than a stop based upon a citizen's
suspicion of Moore being parked in the wrong place, the stop would have
been legal and the further evidence acquired admissible against Moore.
As it was, however, the evidence had to be suppressed. Parking in 12an
9
unusual place is insufficient to raise suspicion of criminal behavior.
Credibility findings by a trial court will be upheld unless they are
3
clearly erroneous. 3 0 In State v. Keddington,' ' Officer Bates stopped
Keddington because her Mitsubishi had "Euro" style taillights-white
lenses with red circles in the middle. The problem with these taillights,
according to Bates, is that they violate section 40-8-23(e) of the Official
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Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), 3 2 which requires that "[a]ll
lenses on taillights shall be maintained in good repair and shall meet
manufacturers' specifications."' 3 Bates claimed to have conducted
personal research to determine that these "Euro" style lights did not
meet Mitsubishi's specifications. However, Bates could not produce any
documents to support his research, he could not identify what Mitsubishi's taillight specifications were, and he did not know who made
Mitsubishi taillights. The State, in arguing its case, told the trial court
that the court's decision would come down to whether the court believed
that Bates thought the taillights violated the law, giving him reasonable
suspicion to pull over the car to investigate, even if he could not support
his belief in court. The trial court, however, apparently did not believe
for the stop to
Bates.' 4 The court of appeals held Bates's justification
35
have been unreasonable and not in good faith.
"[Wihere police acquire information from an anonymous informant or
one of unknown reliability, this is ordinarily not a sufficient basis to
provide reasonable suspicion [to make a traffic stop, a tier two encoun" 13 6
ter], unless the information exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability.
In Slocum v. State,' 37 a "female called 911 at night from a payphone
near an intersection on a major thoroughfare in Hall County reporting
that she had been assaulted by a white male and that a dark colored
sport utility vehicle ("SUV") was involved." 3 ' The officers pulled over
a dark Ford Explorer SUV about a block away from the intersection
where the call had been made. That was all the information the officers
received. They had no identity of the 911 caller, when or where the
alleged assault had occurred, how the SUV or anyone in it was involved,
or any further description of the SUV. Slocum, the driver of the SUV,
had been drinking and driving. His subsequent conviction for DUI was
reversed, however, because the officers lacked a sufficient indicia of
that this particular SUV was
reliability to have a reasonable suspicion
139
the SUV the 911 caller described.
Appellate courts have clearly defined the factors of a roadblock
warrant so that evidence seized will be admissible against the driver

132. O.C.GA. § 40-8-23(c) (2003).
133. Keddington, 264 Ga. App.. at 912, 592 S.E.2d at 533.
134. Id. at 913, 592 S.E.2d at 533.
135. Id. at 914, 592 S.E.2d at 534.
136. Slocum v. State, 267 Ga. App. 337, 338, 599 S.E.2d 299, 300 (2004). See also
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
137. 267 Ga. App. 337, 599 S.E.2d 299 (2004).
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who encounters one."4 The factors are as follows: (1) The decision to
set up a roadblock must be made by a supervisory police officer, not an
officer in the field, and (2) the supervisory officer must have a valid
primary purpose for the roadblock, other than a general search for any
sort of criminal behavior.' 4 ' Two roadblock cases were reversed this
reporting period because the State failed to call the supervisor as a
witness to establish these two simple conditions. 14 2 Hearsay from field
ordered the roadblock for a valid purpose is not
officers that a supervisor
4
sufficient evidence.1 1

In State v. Charles,'" Charles and Jackson got a room at the
Suburban Lodge motel. Someone called the police to complain of "heavy
foot traffic going in and out of" the boys' room. 145 No doubt with
thoughts of drug-dealing on their mind, three officers arrived to
investigate. When Jackson opened the door, two of the officers smelled
marijuana. Jackson told them the room belonged to his uncle, and he
was there with a friend. Soon after, Charles came out of the room, and
one of the officers, admitted he had
in response to a question from
146
smoked pot earlier that day.

The officers then asked if they might enter the room. The boys said
"no." One officer entered anyway to make a "protective sweep." During
the protective sweep, the officer noticed a bag of pot on the toilet tank.
The officer testified he had intended to apply for a search warrant before
he swept; however, the officer who actually obtained the search warrant
testified that no one said anything about a search warrant until the
sweeper found the pot on the commode. When the officer returned with
some scales, and about twenty-five
the search warrant, more marijuana,
147
rocks of cocaine were found.

The decision by the trial court to suppress the evidence, and the
appellate court's affirmation of that decision, turned, in large part, on
the nature of a protective sweep. 48 "'A "protective sweep" is a limited
search of the [premises] primarily to ensure officer safety by detecting
the presence of other occupants.'' 149 The court determined that
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neither of the boys posed a threat to the officers; therefore, there was no
reason to perform a protective sweep.'O
But what about the marijuana smell? Surely that establishes probable
cause to believe a crime is being committed. After all, the State argued,
the appellate court has held that an officer may search a car based only
upon the smell of marijuana wafting through the window during a traffic
stop.' 5' But this case involved a motel room, not a car. Additionally,
the search warrant said "slight odor of burned marijuana," not "burning
marijuana." 1 2 This led the court to hold that a weak odor of stale
marijuana in a motel room is not enough information to support a search
warrant.'5'
Is it enough that one of the occupants of the room admitted to having
smoked pot earlier that day? "Because marijuana is a consumable
product, this Court has previously recognized that an admission that
marijuana had been used in the past may be insufficient to show that
marijuana may be currently on the premises."" Neither Jackson nor
Charles smelled like marijuana, they did not appear to be intoxicated,
and the odor from the room was not fresh marijuana. Furthermore,
neither defendant admitted there was any marijuana in the room.
Armed with this weak evidence, the officers did not have enough
information to obtain a search warrant. 5
The supreme court granted certiorarito consider whether a statement
against one's penal interest is sufficient to authorize issuance of a search
warrant in Graddy u. State.'56 This issue first arose when police
arrested Mills near Graddy's property and charged him with possession
of a concealed weapon. 57 "After his arrest, Mills provided information" that he observed Graddy's son manufacturing methamphetamine
on the property.'58 The magistrate concluded that this inside information was sufficient to issue the search warrant for Graddy's premises.
Graddy was arrested and charged with manufacturing methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine within one thousand feet of a
school, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.' 59
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The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court of appeals
reversed, and the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals. 60
There is a general rule of evidence in criminal cases that "hearsay
statements that are against the criminal interest of a third party
declarant and exculpatory of the accused are inadmissible."''
But what about using a third party declarant's hearsay to obtain a
search warrant? The supreme court has determined this is acceptable
because, "[Tihat rationale for discounting exculpatory statements against
penal interest does not apply in the pre-trial warrant context, where the
issue 'is not guilt beyond reasonable doubt but probable cause for
believing the occurrence of a crime and the secreting of evidence in
specific premises.' 162
The court of appeals faced a novel issue in a search case upon which
the Georgia Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Randolph v.
State.'" Do the police have the authority to conduct a warrantless
search of a house when one spouse says "go ahead and search" and the
other spouse says "get lost"? Scott Randolph and his wife separated.
Ms. Randolph loaded her clothes and left for Canada with the couples'
child. About two months later, Ms. Randolph returned to Georgia with
the child. After a couple of days back at home with her husband, Ms.
Randolph called the police. Mr. Randolph had taken the child from the
house, she reported, and she was "very upset." When the police arrived,
Ms. Randolph accused her husband of using cocaine, thereby causing
money problems for the family. Not long after, Mr. Randolph arrived
home and explained to the police that he had taken the child to a
neighbor's house because he feared that his wife was about to run again.
He also told the police that his wife was drunk and was an alcoholic." 6
The reporting officer asked Mr. Randolph for consent to search the
house for evidence of cocaine use.'65 "When Mr. Randolph responded
with an unequivocal 'no,' [the officer] turned to Ms. Randolph and asked
She "readily" agreed to the search. She took the
for her consent."'
officer to an upstairs bedroom, where he found evidence Ms. Randolph
knew would be there. The officer collected a straw and cocaine residue
and called the district attorney's office. The officer was informed to stop
searching and to obtain a search warrant. At that point Ms. Randolph
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withdrew her consent to the search. The officer took the couple to the
police station, obtained a warrant, and returned to the house to complete
the search. The officer found more evidence of drug use. After Mr.
Randolph was indicted, he filed a motion to suppress, which the trial
court denied. 6 7 The court of appeals accepted an interlocutory appeal
from that denial.'
Even though "it is well established that 'the consent of one who
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against
the absent nonconsenting person with whom authority is shared[,] [t]his
is so ...

because it is reasonable" 69 to assume that one co-habitant

could exercise authority for both if "one person with equal rights in a
place refuses to honor a co-occupant's objection, such refusal hints of
underlying trouble in the relationship and should raise a question as to
why consent was given. "171 The court of appeals reached this conclusion with, notably, no Georgia Supreme Court or United States Supreme
Court case precisely on point. 17 ' But its reasoning is unassailable and,
so the Authors hope, will be upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court: "If
'common authority' is the basis for allowing one co-occupant to consent
to a search on behalf of all occupants, it seems reasonable that 'common
authority' should permit a co-occupant to exercise privacy rights on
behalf of all occupants." 72
F

Discovery
The appellate courts were presented with very few issues concerning
discovery during this reporting period. The two decisions by the Georgia
Supreme Court in which discovery violations were the basis for a
reversal-both decided within the same week in October-involved
Brady73 violations.
In Stripling v. State,'74 the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction for murder and his death sentence.

75

Stripling filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court vacated the
death sentence after finding that the State had impermissibly sup-
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pressed evidence in support of Stripling's mental retardation. '76 Trial
counsel sought to obtain defendant's parole file, hoping there would be
additional information in defendant's lengthy file to support his claim of
mental retardation. The trial court received the parole file, inspected it
in camera and reported to the parties that the evidence in the file that
was relevant was cumulative to the testimony of the defense psychiatrist
who had
testified previously at a competency hearing for the de177
fense.
At the sentencing phase, the defense presented evidence of low I.Q.
scores and testimony from a psychiatrist and psychologist to support its
claim that Stripling was mentally retarded. The State responded by
presenting: evidence of one intelligence test with a higher score; the
testimony of a state psychologist that Stripling had average intelligence;
evidence that Stripling's prior bank robberies showed some degree of
planning; testimony from coworkers that Stripling could hold a job,
drive, and operate machinery; and records from prison showing
satisfactory performance in the vocational classes he had taken.'
The crux of the State's response to the defense claim of mental
retardation was that "the defense
had recently concocted [Stripling's]
" 179
alleged mental retardation.
Yet more than a decade after Stripling's trial, when the habeas court
reviewed the same parole file that the trial court inspected in camera,
it was evident that the parole file contained information supporting
Stripling's claim of mental retardation that was not cumulative, and,
moreover, would have undermined the prosecution's claim that
Stripling's mental retardation was created by the defense." ° The file
showed that state officials and Stripling's mother characterized him as
mentally retarded as early as the 1970s, and that the intelligence test
score relied upon by the State at trial was "questionable."'
The parole file is controlled by the attorney general. The Georgia
Supreme Court agreed that the attorney general's office was part of the
"prosecution team," for purposes of the Brady analysis because it was the
entity that transmitted the parole file to the trial court for in camera
review."' The suppression of this evidence, therefore, was a violation
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of Brady v. Maryland."' Because there was a reasonable probability
that the evidence would have affected the outcome of Stripling's trial,
the habeas court determination that defendant had to be retried on
mental retardation and sentencing was affirmed."8
In Brownlow v. Schofield,' the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
habeas court's denial of Brownlow's petition challenging his conviction
for aggravated sodomy, holding that the prosecutor's suppression of
exculpatory evidence violated defendant's due process rights and
required reversal.' s In a videotaped interview, Brownlow's grandson
denied that his grandfather had inappropriately touched him. This
videotape was revealed to the defense.8 7 Ten days before trial, the
prosecutor interviewed the child and asked him whether his grandfather
had ever put his mouth on the child's penis; the child "responded by
The prosecutor revealed this convershaking his head negatively."'
sation to89the defense only after Brownlow's conviction was affirmed on
1
appeal.
The Georgia Supreme Court considered the following question in
agreeing to grant the certificate of probable cause: "[Ils the habeas court
authorized to deny relief where the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence
which is favorable to the defense, but which is weaker than similar
exculpatory evidence which was admitted at trial?"' 90 The question
was a response to the applicability of the United States Supreme Court
opinion in the case of Kyles v. Whitley. 9' The United States Supreme
Court held that suppressed evidence was to be considered "collectively,
not item by item." 1" This holding was relied upon by the habeas court
in Brownlow to conclude that because the defense and the jury were
already aware of the child's initial recantation, the weaker head-shaking
recantation did not support a finding that there was a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different if this information had not been suppressed.'93
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the habeas court had improperly applied the holding in Kyles, ruling that a finding that a suppressed
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piece of exculpatory evidence was "weaker" than a piece of disclosed
exculpatory evidence, did not demand a denial of relief, but instead, was
a factual finding that should then be applied to the essential question 19 4-"whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different had the suppressed evidence,
considered collectively, been disclosed to the defense."195
III.

GUILTY PLEAS

In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, the defendant must be
advised of all of the rights he is waiving upon entry of a plea, and he
must explicitly acknowledge an understanding of those rights and his
desire to waive them.1" In Foskey v. Battle,97 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the method utilized in Coffee County Superior Court was
insufficient to establish that defendant's plea was intelligent and
voluntary."' The trial court utilized a pre-printed, typewritten form
with nineteen questions and typewritten answers entitled, "transcript of
proceedings."1 99 During the accompanying plea colloquy, defendant
was not orally advised of any of those rights, nor was he asked to state
whether he understood those rights or had agreed to waive them."'
The Georgia Supreme Court held the plea was invalid.0 1
If the trial court is not willing to accept the negotiated plea recommendation between the defense and the State, the court is bound to notify
the parties of this fact before accepting the defendant's guilty plea.20 2
If the court intends to reject a plea agreement, the court must explicitly
advise the defendant that: (1) the court is not bound by the plea
agreement; (2) the court intends to reject the plea agreement; (3) the
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than the
deal contemplated by the plea agreement; and (4) the defendant has the
right to withdraw the plea.20 3
In Mulkey v. State,20 4 the trial judge told defendant that he did not

intend to follow a part of the plea recommendation, but the judge did not
inform defendant which portion he rejected nor that the disposition of
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265 Ga. App. 631, 595 S.E.2d 330 (2004).
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her case could be less favorable than the plea recommendation. 20 5 The
appellate court held that the trial court could not presume that
defendant's "highly experienced" attorney would have explained to her
that rejection of the plea recommendation meant defendant would likely
be sentenced more harshly; what mattered were the statements the court
made directly to defendant. 2' Because the court failed to explicitly
state the four factors set forth in State v. Germany, °7 Mulkey's plea
was not valid, and her plea and sentence had to be reversed. 0 8
In a case of first impression, Carlisle v. State,2° the Georgia Supreme Court considered "whether certain criminal charges which had
been the subject of a previous order of nolle prosequi [could] be revived"
after the statute of limitations had expired and when the dismissal was
entered pursuant to a plea agreement, which defendant later rescinded
by withdrawing her guilty pleas.210 In 1997 Carlisle entered a negotiated plea to four counts of an indictment. In exchange, the State
tendered a nolle prosequi on the remaining seven counts. In 1999
Carlisle filed a habeas corpus petition, asserting that her mental
disorder and lack of medication prevented her from entering a knowing
and voluntary plea. The habeas court granted the petition, the State
appealed, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 1'
Carlisle returned to court for her retrial and filed a motion to limit her
trial to only those four counts that were the subject of her plea, arguing
that the statute of limitations had run on the additional seven counts
that the State had nol-prossed. The trial court and the court of appeals
disagreed, the latter holding that the plea agreement was like a contract,
binding both parties, and when one party breaks the agreement (as
Carlisle did when she was successful in withdrawing her guilty pleas)
the parties needed to be returned to their pre-contract state.212
Disagreeing with the court of appeals, the supreme court held that the
issue was not a question invoking contract law, but instead, was a
jurisdictional question. 3 Because the prosecutor failed to re-indict
Carlisle for the previously nol prossed offenses during the limitations
period, which the Georgia Code permits," 4 the trial court was without

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 631, 595 S.E.2d at 331.
Id.
Germany, 246 Ga. at 455, 271 S.E.2d at 851.
Mulkey, 265 Ga. App. at 632, 595 S.E.2d at 331.
277 Ga. 99, 586 S.E.2d 240 (2003).
Id. at 99, 586 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 99-100, 586 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 101, 586 S.E.2d at 242.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-3-3 (2003).
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on those offenses for which the statute of
jurisdiction to try Carlisle
215
limitations had run.
IV.

JURY SELECTION

The trial court has the discretion to permit or deny questions on voir
dire. Sometimes, this discretion can be abused, as in the case of Laster
v. State.216 In Laster defense counsel wanted to ask the potential
jurors whether the extended period of time between the alleged murder
and the trial would affect their deliberations. The trial court disallowed
this question on the basis that this inquiry asked the jury to prejudge
the case. The Georgia Supreme Court, however, disagreed and reversed
Laster's conviction for malice murder, holding that the trial court abused
its discretion in prohibiting that question because it was a legitimate
question, properly aimed at determining any bias or prejudice on the
part of prospective jurors. 17
In Valentine v. State,215 the appellate court concluded the trial court
had also abused its discretion by improperly attempting to rehabilitate
a juror who explicitly stated she could not be fair.21 9 After being sworn
in, but before opening statements had begun, the juror reported to the
bailiff that she recognized the victim's mother as a fellow church
member. The court conducted a brief colloquy with the juror, inquiring
whether her relationship with the victim's mother would have "any effect
on [her] ability to fairly and impartially judge the guilt or innocence of
The
The juror responded, "Honestly, yes."22
the defendant?" 2
court then asked questions of the juror, inquiring whether she could
listen fairly to the testimony and give defendant a fair trial, to which the
juror responded affirmatively. Asking only two "talismanic" questions,
the court violated the prohibition in Kim v. Walls222 against the use of
inadequate rehabilitative questioning by the court, which necessitated
reversal of Valentine's conviction.2 23
The opinion in Valentine is difficult to square, however, with the court
of appeals decision affirming the conviction for aggravated child

215. Carlisle, 277 Ga. App. at 101, 586 S.E.2d at 242.
216. 276 Ga. 645, 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003).
217. Id. at 647-48, 581 S.E.2d at 525-26. The court also concluded there was error in
the trial court's limitation on closing argument and its failure to properly instruct the jury.
Id.
218. 265 Ga. App. 139, 592 S.E.2d 918 (2004).
219. Id. at 141, 592 S.E.2d at 920.
220. Id. at 140, 592 S.E.2d at 919.
221. Id.
222. 275 Ga. 177, 180, 563 S.E.2d 847, 850 (2002).
223. Valentine, 265 Ga. App. at 141, 592 S.E.2d at 920.
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molestation and cruelty to children in Doss v. State, 4 entered less
than two months later.22 The potential juror in Doss reported that
she had been sexually molested as a child on two separate occasions,
involving two different perpetrators. 226 She was questioned by the
court and both attorneys and responded that she was not sure whether
towards men who
she could be fair, stating that
22 7 she had "prejudices
would do that kind of thing."
After the defense moved to strike the juror for cause, the court asked
a lengthy question, explaining to the juror her need to listen to the
evidence and the court's charge and render a verdict based solely on the
evidence. The court ended the question by telling the juror that if her
past experiences made it impossible for her to judge the case solely on
the evidence, she would not be qualified to serve. 2' The juror responded, "I think I could do it." 22 9 The motion to strike for cause was
denied.23 °
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that
the lengthy question by the court was "as close to being nonleading as
most lawyers can come." 23' Although the appellate court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the juror for
cause, it noted that the better decision would have been to grant the
motion, "especially when the potential juror [was] a victim of the same
crime for which the accused [was] on trial."23 2
The language in Kim was invoked again, this time by the Georgia
Court of Appeals, in reversing the conviction for child molestation in
Invoking the Kim opinion, trial courts were reminded
Kier v. State.'
that in jury selection, "[i]f error is to be committed, let it be in favor of
the absolute impartiality and purity of the jurors."2" In Kier defense
counsel sought to strike for cause a potential juror who was employed at
the jail where Kier was being housed awaiting trial. The juror,
questioned extensively and repeatedly, stated that he could be fair and
agreed not to reveal to the other jurors the fact that Kier was being held
at the jail. Kier moved to strike for cause, the trial court denied the
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264 Ga. App. 205, 590 S.E.2d 208 (2003).
Id. at 205, 590 S.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 208, 590 S.E.2d at 210.
Id., 590 S.E.2d at 212.
Id. at 209-10, 590 S.E.2d at 212-13.
Id. at 210, 590 S.E.2d at 213.
Id.
Id. at 212, 590 S.E.2d at 214.
Id. at 213, 590 S.E.2d at 215.
263 Ga. App. 347, 347, 587 S.E.2d 841, 841 (2003).
Id. at 348, 587 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting Kim, 275 Ga. at 178, 563 S.E.2d at 849).
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forced to use one of his peremptory strikes to
request, and Kier23was
5
juror.
this
remove
The appellate court held that the fact that this corrections officer was
working at the very jail in which Kier was incarcerated, awaiting trial
on the very charges that the juror would be asked to hear, created a
"substantial appearance of impropriety" necessitating reversal. 6
V.

A.

STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF

Severance

The American Bar Association ("ABA") Standards on Joinder of
Offenses direct that offenses that are joined for trial solely on the ground
that they are of the same or similar character must be severed upon the
defendant's request. 37 The standard, however, is undermined by the
nature of similar transaction evidence in that the offenses that would
automatically be severed pursuant to the ABA Standard end up being
23 8
admissible in the trial anyway as evidence of a "similar transaction."
In Stewart v. State,3 9 Stewart was tried and convicted for various
offenses arising out of separate attacks on three different women. The
Georgia Supreme Court reviewed what had become the norm in
analyzing a motion to sever offenses when evidence of the severed
offenses would have been admitted as similar transactions.2 4 ° Severance was not required because the offenses "were sufficiently similar so
that evidence from each victim would have been admissible in the other
trials had the cases been tried separately."241
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the finding that evidence of one
offense would be admissible in a trial for another offense as a similar
transaction "is a relevant consideration in determining whether to
sever,"242 but does not end the inquiry; the court would still need 24to3
determine if part (b) of the ABA Standards on Joinder of Offenses

235. Id. at 347-48, 587 S.E.2d at 842.
236. Id. at 350, 587 S.E.2d at 843.
237. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 13-3.1 (2004).
238. UNIF. SUPERIOR CT. RULE 31-2.
239. 277 Ga. 138, 587 S.E.2d 602 (2003).
240. Id. at 138, 587 S.E.2d at 603.
241. Stewart v. State, 259 Ga. App. 117, 122, 576 S.E.2d 93, 97 (2003).
242. Stewart, 277 Ga. at 140, 587 S.E.2d at 604.
243. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 13-3.1 (2004). Section (b) determines
whether the trier of fact would be able to fairly and intelligently assess guilt or innocence
as to each charge. Id.
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necessitated severance of offenses. 2 The case was remanded to the
trial court for it to conduct this further inquiry into whether the trier of
fact could fairly assess guilt or innocence as to each charge.245
Statements of the Defendant
When the accused invokes his right to counsel, all interrogation must
cease and it can only begin again if the accused voluntarily initiates
In State v. Langlands,247 defendant was
further conversation.'
2 ' rights, and Langlands responded that he
advised of his Miranda
wished to invoke his right to counsel. 249 The officer no longer interrogated Langlands about the offense he was suspected of having committed, but "repeatedly questioned Langlands about his attorney and
stressed that once Langlands obtained counsel, Jarrell [the investigator]
'really needed' to talk to Langlands because he 'really needed to know
his side of the story.'" 250 Langlands eventually said that he would talk
with the investigator without an attorney. The trial court suppressed
defendant's custodial statement to the police, finding that the investigator's attempts to encourage Langlands to speak rendered defendant's
decision to talk to the investigator, without his attorney, 2involun52
tary.251 The court of appeals agreed and affirmed the decision.
In State v. Pinkerton,2" the court of appeals again agreed with the
trial court's ruling that the accused had not validly waived his right to
counsel.2M In Pinkerton the appellate court concluded that although
Pinkerton's waiver was voluntary, it was not intelligently or knowingly
made. 5 Pinkerton appeared for his arraignment, was advised by the
court of his right to counsel, and waived his right to counsel so that he
could engage in plea negotiations with the prosecutor. During this
conversation with the prosecutor, Pinkerton made some incriminating
statements. The negotiations broke down, and when later notified that
B.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Stewart, 277 Ga. at 140, 587 S.E.2d at 604.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (2003).
Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966).
Langlands, 276 Ga. at 721, 583 S.E.2d at 18-19.
Id., 583 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 721-22, 583 S.E.2d at 19.
Id.
262 Ga. App. 858, 586 S.E.2d 743 (2003).
Id. at 859, 586 S.E.2d at 745.
Id., 586 S.E.2d at 743.
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the State intended to introduce his inculpatory statements into evidence,
256
defendant, now represented, moved to have the statements excluded.
The trial court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that although
Pinkerton freely and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, "he did not
do so knowingly since the court had failed to give him sufficient
warnings."2 5 ' Before permitting a waiver of counsel at a critical stage
of a criminal prosecution, the accused must be informed of more than
simply his right to counsel; he must be informed of, and understand, the
nature of the charges against him, the range of punishment, possible
"any other facts necessary for
defenses, mitigating circumstances, and
28
a broad understanding of the matter." 1

Similar TransactionsIn Perry v. State,259 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault
and sexual battery, holding that the trial court improperly admitted
evidence that when Perry was eighteen years old, he pleaded guilty to
the offense of child molestation, which arose out of his having engaged
in nonforcible sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl.26 °
Acknowledging the appellate court's policy of liberally upholding the
admissibility of independent crimes in sexual offense cases, the court of
appeals nevertheless concluded that "we do not believe that a nonviolent
sexual encounter with a261minor shows a predilection to commit forcible
C.

rape against an adult."

D. Cross-Examination
The Rape Shield Statute262 mandates that evidence relating to the
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of a sexual crime is not
In Richardson v. State,2
admissible in the trial of the accused. 2
the Georgia Supreme Court considered a trial court's prohibition of the
defense's attempt to cross-examine the alleged victim to show that she
engaged in consensual intercourse with defendant, but after becoming
concerned that this act would hinder her attempts to reconcile with a

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 858-59, 586 S.E.2d at 743-44.
Id. at 859, 586 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 859-60, 586 S.E.2d at 745.
263 Ga. App. 670, 588 S.E.2d 838 (2003).
Id. at 670-71, 588 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 671, 588 S.E.2d at 840.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (2003).
Id.
276 Ga. 639, 581 S.E.2d 528 (2003).
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former boyfriend, she fabricated the rape story.26 The court of appeals
upheld the trial court's prohibition of this evidence pursuant to the Rape
Shield Statute. 2" The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the conviction, holding that the prohibition of the Rape Shield
Statute is limited only to those sexual aspects of relationships of the
victim, not the facts that she was involved, had been involved, or hoped
to be involved again in a relationship when it is relevant to the theory
of the defense.267
E.

Admissibility of Hearsay

The United States Supreme Court's decision of Crawford v. Washington 2" forced the trial and appellate courts in Georgia to modify the
manner in which the admissibility of hearsay testimony is considered." 9 In Crawford the United States Supreme Court barred out-ofcourt testimonial statements of witnesses unless the witness was
unavailable and the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.27 ° These requirements are essential to the admissibility of the
statement, regardless of whether the trial court determines that the outof-court statement was reliable. The requirements overruled the longstanding rules and practice concerning the admissibility of hearsay.2 '
Two weeks after the decision in Crawford, the Georgia Supreme Court
decided Moody v. State,2 in which Moody had been convicted of the
malice murder of his girlfriend, Rebecca Norman. Under the cloak of the
necessity exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court permitted a police
officer to testify about what Norman told him after Moody had previously fired a gun into her bedroom while she was sleeping.27
Relying
upon Crawford, the appellate court concluded the testimony was
inadmissible, but, as it was cumulative of other testimony, the error was
harmless. 4

265. Id. at 640-41, 581 S.E.2d at 529.
266. Id.
267. Id., 581 S.E.2d at 530.
268. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
269. Id. at 1364.
270. Id.
271. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 1366 (2004).
272. 277 Ga. 676, 594 S.E.2d 350 (2004).
273. Id. at 679-80, 594 S.E.2d at 353-54.
274. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 354.
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One week later, the Georgia Supreme Court considered the impact of
Crawford on the admission of hearsay testimony in the murder trial of
Demons v. State.275 At trial, the
victim's co-worker, Jackie Bohr, testified that, two days before the
murder, the victim was distressed and had bruises on his upper arms
and chest, that he began crying and told her where the bruises came
from, that she had never seen anybody so afraid of anyone else, and
that he said that Demons was going to kill him.276
The Georgia Supreme Court determined that Crawford's limitation on
the admissibility of hearsay under the necessity exception applied only
to testimonial, out-of-court statements, which, they concluded, were
distinguishable from the hearsay statements admitted because "they
were made in a conversation with a friend, before the commission of any
crime, and without any reasonable expectation that they would be used
at a later trial."277 Finding that the hearsay statements were not
testimonial, the trial court was permitted to consider indicia of reliability
The Georgia
other than the opportunity for cross-examination."7
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court was correct in concluding
that the hearsay statements were reliable and properly admitted.279
Surprisingly, less than two months later, two opinions 280 were
returned by the Georgia Supreme Court concerning the admissibility of
hearsay under the necessity exception. Crawford was applied in one
case but not even mentioned in the other case. In Bell v. State,28 ' the
trial court admitted evidence of prior difficulties between the deceased
wife and defendant husband through testimony of the wife's best friend,
who claimed that Ms. Bell had told her that Mr. Bell had threatened to
kill her.282 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's
analysis of the admissibility of the hearsay under the Georgia test at the
time of the trial, but the court noted that because of Crawford, the
statements of the friend would be deemed inadmissible because they
were "testimonial in nature, and were inadmissible since Ms. Bell was
unavailable to testify at trial and Mr. Bell did not have a prior

275. 277 Ga. 724, 595 S.E.2d 76 (2004).
276. Id. at 726, 595 S.E.2d at 79.
277. Id. at 727-28, 595 S.E.2d at 80.
278. Id. at 728, 595 S.E.2d at 80.
279. Id. at 729, 595 S.E.2d at 81.
280. Bell v. State, 278 Ga. 69, 597 S.E.2d 350 (2004); Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853,
596 S.E.2d 597 (2004).
281. 278 Ga. 69, 597 S.E.2d 350 (2004).
282. Id. at 71, 597 S.E.2d at 353.
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opportunity to cross-examine the victim about the statements."2 s
Given the strength of the evidence against Bell and the cumulative
nature of the hearsay testimony concerning the threats he had previously made towards his wife, the error was deemed harmless."
Yet on the same day, the Georgia Supreme Court decided the case of
85
which also evaluated the admissibility of hearsay
Williams v. State,"
under the necessity exception. Notably, the Crawford case was not
mentioned. At defendant's trial the State introduced evidence of prior
difficulties between defendant and the deceased by calling two State's
witnesses who were permitted to testify about statements that the
deceased had made to them concerning defendant's abuse of her.2" 6
Without considering the impact of Crawford on their analysis, the court,
nevertheless, held that the hearsay should not have been admitted
because it was not any more probative than other nonhearsay evidence
that could have been presented. 8 ' But, again, the error was deemed
harmless, given the "overwhelming evidence of Williams'[s] commission
of the murder."2'
VI.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

O.C.G.A. section 17-8-71289 states that defense counsel has the right
to open and conclude closing arguments if the defendant does not
produce any evidence other than the defendant's testimony.2' There
is often some debate over whether the defense introduces evidence
through impeachment of State's witnesses. The standard for determining whether the defense has introduced evidence for the purpose of
determining whether the defense has forfeited final closing argument
was established in 2000 in the case of Smith v. State.2 91 If the defendant merely impeaches the State's witness by reading only portions of
a prior statement, directly related to the impeachment, the defendant
has not introduced evidence.292 If, however, the defendant's counsel
reads portions of the prior statement that are unrelated to impeachment,
the defense has introduced evidence and forfeits the final closing. 93
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284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
277 Ga. 853, 596 S.E.2d 597 (2004).
Id. at 854, 596 S.E.2d at 600.
Id. at 855, 596 S.E.2d at 601.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-71 (2003).
Id.
272 Ga. 874, 536 S.E.2d 514 (2000).
Id. at 877, 536 S.E.2d at 517.
Id.
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In two instances during this reporting period, the trial court erroneously concluded that the defense had introduced evidence during
In
impeachment and forfeited their final closing arguments.2 94
Thomas v. State,29 5 defense counsel attempted to impeach the officer
who had interviewed defendant by using the officer's report to highlight
inconsistencies and omissions between the officer's direct testimony and
incident report. Additionally, defense counsel referred to and displayed
other police reports and reports from the Department of Family and
Children Services ("DFCS") although he did not read from these
reports.2" The supreme court concluded that this impeachment and
reference to other reports did not constitute the introduction of evidence;
in ordering that the defense had forfeited
therefore, the trial court erred
2 97
the final closing argument.
In West v. State,295 the trial court, likewise, erroneously concluded
that the defense had introduced evidence and forfeited the closing
argument. During the State's case, the prosecutor introduced into
evidence a videotape of the execution of the search warrant, and the tape
was admitted into evidence and played without audio to the jury. On
cross-examination defense counsel played the tape again, this time with
the sound on.2 " Because the tape was already a piece of evidence, the
court of appeals ruled that it was error to consider the playing of the
audio as the introduction of new evidence. 300 As the evidence of guilt
was not so overwhelming to consider this error harmless, the conviction
was reversed.0 1
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the meaning
of the words, "in conclusion," found in the statute" 2 governing the
number of attorneys who can participate in the closing argument for
each side. 3 3 The relevant portion of this statute states that "[njot
more than two counsel shall be permitted to argue any cause for each
side, except by express leave of the court; and in no case shall more than
one counsel be heard in conclusion."3 4

294. Thomas v. State, 262 Ga. App. 492, 589 S.E.2d 243 (2003); West v. State, 265 Ga.
App. 339, 593 S.E.2d 874 (2004).
295. 262 Ga. App. 492, 589 S.E.2d 243 (2003).
296. Id. at 495, 589 S.E.2d at 247.
297. Id. at 497-98, 589 S.E.2d at 249.
298. 265 Ga. App. 339, 593 S.E.2d 874 (2004).
299. Id. at 339, 593 S.E.2d at 874.
300. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 876-77.
301. Id. at 342, 593 S.E.2d at 877.
302. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70 (2003).
303. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 182, 587 S.E.2d 27, 28 (2003).
304. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70.
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The defense in Sheriff v. State30 5 introduced evidence; therefore, "the
State was entitled to make the opening and concluding closing arguments."30

'

The defense wanted to divide their closing argument

between both defense attorneys. The State objected and the trial court
sustained the objection, relying upon the second clause of O.C.G.A.
section 17-8-70, as stated above. 0 7
The Georgia Supreme Court noted the split of decisions between those
cases that held the one-lawyer limitation applied only to the final
concluding argument, not the middle argument,3 and the cases 'that
extended the one-lawyer limitation to the middle argument.3° The
Georgia Supreme Court, "faced with conflicting constructions of
[O.C.G.A. section] 17-8-70," concluded that the statutory limitation of
one-lawyer "heard in conclusion" applies only to the party arguing the
final conclusion, not the middle closing argument, thereby overruling the
line of cases that held otherwise and ordering that the Uniform Court
Rules be construed in conformity with this holding. 1
O.C.G.A. section 17-8-7331 provides that closing arguments in a case
involving a capital felony are limited to two hours for each side. 2 In
two instances during this reporting period, trial courts attempted to
abridge this right and limit defense counsel's closing arguments to one
hour.31 3 In both instances the Georgia Supreme Court presumed harm
from this error and held that the evidence was not so overwhelming that
the limitation on counsel's right to continue his closing argument could
be said to be harmless, necessitating the reversal of both murder
convictions. 1 4
The prosecuting attorney, while presenting a closing argument, "may
strike hard blows, [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."31 5

305. 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003).
306. Id. at 183, 587 S.E.2d at 28.
307. Id.
308. Steverson v. Eason, 194 Ga. App. 273, 390 S.E.2d 424 (1990); Goforth v. Wigley,
178 Ga. App. 558, 343 S.E.2d 788 (1986); Taylor v. Powell, 158 Ga. App. 339, 280 S.E.2d
386 (1981); Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615, 263 S.E.2d 502 (1979).
309. Bentley v. B.M.W., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 526, 433 S.E.2d 719 (1993); City of Monroe
v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 332, 411 S.E.2d 511 (1991); Bridges v. Schier, 195 Ga. App. 583,
394 S.E.2d 408 (1990); White v. Cline, 174 Ga. App. 448, 330 S.E.2d 386 (1985).
310. Sheriff, 277 Ga. at 187, 587 S.E.2d at 31.
311. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-73 (2003).
312. Id.
313. Hendricks v. State, 277 Ga, 61, 586 S.E.2d 317 (2003); Laster v. State, 276 Ga.
645, 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003).
314. Hendricks, 277 Ga. at 63, 586 S.E.2d at 317; Laster, 276 Ga. at 650, 581 S.E.2d
at 526.
315. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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Arguing that the jury consider similar transaction evidence for an
impermissible purpose is such a foul. In Collier v. State,31 the trial
court admitted extrinsic evidence of two prior bar fights during Collier's
trial for aggravated assault, which also occurred in a bar.31 7 The
similar transactions were introduced to defeat Collier's defense of
justification by "showing Collier's modus operandi, scheme, course of
conduct, and bent of mind under particular circumstances."3 18 Yet in
his closing argument, the prosecutor pointed out the leniency afforded
to Collier in the prior assault cases by stating that Collier received
probationary sentences. Relying upon that fact, the prosecutor asked the
jury to punish Collier because he had not been imprisoned before and
implored the jury to protect the community from the future dangerousness of defendant. 19 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
prosecutor "blatantly misused" the similar transaction evidence,
exacerbated the error by arguing the future dangerousness of defendant,
and concluded those errors necessitated reversal. 320
VII.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The Georgia Supreme Court took another opportunity to reflect on the
propriety of the Allen v. United States3 2' charge and determined that
a portion of the charge was inaccurate and should no longer be used by
In Burchette v. State, 23 defendant challenged the
trial courts.322
following clause of the Allen charge: "this case must be decided by some
jury selected in the same manner this jury was selected and there is no
reason to think a jury better qualified than you would ever be chosen."324 The court of appeals affirmed Burchette's conviction, relying
on several previous cases in which this language was upheld. 325 The
supreme court, however, concluded that it would follow the trend of
California, Massachusetts, and Iowa, which had reviewed and rejected
this type of language. 326 The Allen charge language was simply not
accurate because a hung jury does not necessarily mean that the case
must be retried; the prosecution always retains the authority, in the face
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of a mistrial, to dismiss the case.32 7 Burchette's conviction, however,
was affirmed because, under the facts of this case, the Allen charge was
not so coercive as to demand a reversal. 2 s Trial courts in the future
are forewarned "that the 'must be decided' charge should no longer be
included in Allen charges in this State." 29
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Supreme Court considered
whether the defense of habitation charge3$ ° can be invoked when the
victim and the defendant occupy separate rooms in the same house.3"'
In Hammock v. State," defendant shot and killed her husband after
he broke down the bedroom door behind which she was locked and
barricaded. The couple had been living in separate bedrooms for several
weeks leading up to the shooting because they were considering a
divorce. On the night of the shooting, after several hours of beating on
the door and hollering at defendant, the alleged victim busted in the
door, entered the bedroom, and had a conversation with defendant.
Defendant told him to leave and informed him that she had already been
to the magistrate judge for a warrant. The alleged victim responded
that he was going to "teach her a lesson."33 3 As he came towards
defendant, she shot him. 3m
The defense of habitation charge authorizes a person to use deadly
force to terminate an unlawful entry into a person's habitation, if: (1)
the entry is violent and tumultuous and (2) the person reasonably
believes the entry was made for the purpose of assaulting their
person.335 In such a case, use of deadly force would be necessary to
prevent that violence.33 The supreme court held that those subsections of O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23, $37 which do not expressly prohibit
applicability to members of the same family or household, could be
extended to separate spaces in a jointly occupied dwelling, "provided that
such person has obtained the right to occupy that space and exclude his
In Hammock the court held that there
co-inhabitants therefrom." 3
had not been sufficient evidence, such as a court order dividing the
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house, or a written agreement between the spouses, or even clear
evidence of the separate right to a section of the household established
by a course of conduct between the spouses; therefore, the trial court did
in denying defendant's request to charge defense of habitanot err
339
tion.
VIII.

SENTENCING

A divided supreme court decided the case of Dixon v. State, °
reversing the eighteen-year-old defendant's conviction for aggravated
child molestation. 341 Dixon, a twelfth-grader, was indicted for rape,
statutory rape, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, aggravated child
molestation, and sexual battery arising out of a sexual encounter with
a fifteen-year-old, who was in the tenth grade at Dixon's high school.
The girl testified that she was forcibly raped, and there was medical
evidence of bruising on her arms and slight vaginal injuries. The
defense admitted sexual intercourse, but alleged that it was consensual
and that the girl said she was 2raped because she feared her father's
reaction to her sexual activity.3
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the counts of rape, false
imprisonment, aggravated assault, and sexual battery, but guilty on the
The
counts of statutory rape and aggravated child molestation.m
defense appealed the aggravated child molestation conviction, arguing
that the conduct for which the jury found Dixon guilty (engaging in
nonforcible sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old) was encompassed
in the misdemeanor statutory rape statute and could not be doubly
punished as aggravated child molestation. 3 "
The majority agreed, holding that a reading of both the misdemeanor
statutory rape and aggravated child molestation statutes showed "a clear
legislative intent to prosecute the conduct that the jury determined to
have occurred in this case as misdemeanor statutory rape."345 The
majority noted that the most compelling indication of the General
Assembly's intent was that the most recent amendment to the statutory
rape statute removed the discretion from the trial court to punish
consensual sexual activity between victims who are fourteen or fifteen
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and perpetrators who are no more than three years older than the
victim, as misdemeanor, not felony, statutory rape and made such
reduced punishment mandatory.346 The majority argued that removing
that discretion from the courts, while still allowing the state to retain
the discretion to "prosecute the [exact] same conduct as either misdemeanor statutory rape or felony child molestation," was "entirely
incongruous with the intent of the legislature." 7 Because the rule of
lenity applied, the majority concluded that when two statutes conflict,
defendant must be afforded the lesser punishment."' The crime of
aggravated child molestation carries a minimum, mandatory sentence of
ten years to serve without parole and up to a maximum sentence of
thirty years in prison. 34s The crime of misdemeanor statutory 50rape
carries a maximum sentence of twelve months at the county jail.
How many times can a person be charged and convicted for possessing
a weapon during the commission of a felony, when that felony is a
continuous crime spree? The Georgia Supreme Court addressed this
issue in State v. Marlowe.3 5 ' Because the court of appeals had previously rendered conflicting opinions, the Georgia Supreme Court
established the definitive answer: Multiple convictions for possession of
a weapon when multiple felonies are committed are permitted only when
the felonies are committed against multiple victims."5 2 In order to
determine whether multiple violations under the same statute violated
the prohibition against double jeopardy, the court had to determine the
appropriate "unit of prosecution" that defined the "precise act or conduct"
that the statute criminalized. 3 ' The court determined that "a defendant may be convicted once for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime as to every individual victim of a crime spree,"
but only once for each crime that is not perpetrated upon an individual. 3 5
For example, in Pearson defendant was charged with and
convicted for ten felonies arising out of an attack on three people. He
was also charged with and convicted for ten counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of each of the predicate felonies.
Applying the new analysis, Pearson could be punished for three weapon
possession offenses arising out of the crimes committed against the three
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separate victims, and two additional weapon possession charges arising
out of the crimes of burglary and hijacking of a motor vehicle. The
additional weapon possession charges, which were based upon all of the
multiple crimes against the three victims, would violate double jeopardy
and would have to be merged with the possession crimes."' Relying
upon what has come to be known as the Marlowe decision, the supreme
period.3 56
court ordered merger in two more cases during this reporting
IX.
A.

APPELLATE ISSUES

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Ordinarily, the failure to advise a client concerning the collateral
consequences of his guilty plea does not rise to the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel and serve to invalidate the plea. But when the
attorney responds to questions from his client concerning the collateral
consequences of his plea and the attorney misadvises the client, counsel
has been ineffective and the plea cannot stand. This was the case in
Rollins v. State,35 7 in which Rollins inquired about the effect of a first
offender plea to a drug charge, especially as it related to her desire to
become a lawyer and her immigration status. Her attorney failed to do
the simple research it would have taken to discover that the plea would
affect Rollins's fitness as a candidate for a bar license and would expose
her to deportation proceedings. Instead, her lawyer told her that there
35
Because the
would be "no negative repercussions" from the plea.
would
Rollins
that
revealed
hearing
habeas
at
the
presented
evidence
not have pleaded guilty had she been given the correct information
concerning the collateral consequences of her plea and because the
State's drug case against her was weak, the denial of the habeas was
3 59
reversed and Rollins was able to withdraw her guilty plea.
S
Similarly, in Smith v. Williams," defendant asked his attorney,
prior to deciding whether to enter his guilty plea, how much time he
could expect to serve before being eligible for parole. The plea offer was
fifteen years to serve on a vehicular homicide, concurrent with a fifteen
year sentence for possession of methamphetamine. Counsel told Smith
he would be eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence.
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However, defense counsel was unaware that three months earlier, on
January 1, 1998, the parole board instituted a ninety percent policy,
which mandated that ninety percent of the sentence for a number of
enumerated crimes, one of which was vehicular homicide, would have to
be served before a defendant would be eligible for parole. This meant
that instead of serving five years before parole eligibility, Smith would
have to serve over thirteen-and-one-half years before his first parole
consideration.36 1 This error rose to the level of satisfying the first tier
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is a finding that counsel's
representation falls outside the permitted range of competence. 62 The
case was remanded for a determination of the second tier, whether the
client was harmed by the error.3
Other instances of conduct that were deemed ineffective included: (1)
badgering a client, on the record, to take a plea and then cussing when
the client told the court that he was not guilty;3 6 (2) an attorney's use
of a peremptory strike on a juror that he failed to realize had already
been stricken for cause by the court, but that the court had erroneously
failed to remove from the remaining panel; 36 5 (3) trial counsel's failure
to move to suppress blood and urine samples when defendant's consent
was clearly not valid;' (4) counsel's failure to object and move for
mistrial when eyewitnesses testified at trial that the prosecutor showed
them a photograph of defendant before trial, tainting their in-court
identification; 67 (5) counsel's failure to object and move for a mistrial
when the investigating officer in a statutory rape case testified that "she
believed the victim was being untruthful when she denied penetration,"
and when the victim later admitted partial penetration, the officer
vouched for the victim's truthfulness;' a (6) counsel's failure to raise a
chain of custody issue when the State presented no evidence to establish
that the drugs tested at the crime lab were the drugs seized from the
defendant;3 69 (7) counsel's failure to investigate and locate corroborating alibi witnesses; 370 (8) counsel's failure to request a charge on
defense of habitation when defendant was sitting in her car at the time
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the alleged victim assaulted her;" 'l and (9) counsel's failure to except
to the trial court's refusal to charge the jury properly on impeachment
by a prior felony.3 7 2
B.

Insufficient Evidence to Convict

The Georgia Supreme Court considered Thompson v. State3 7 3 a case
of first impression this reporting period. The question was: Because
venue is an essential element of the State's case that must be decided by
a jury, may the appellate courts consider venue to have been established
in a pre-trial hearing? Short answer: No. 4 So why, you ask, is this
case in this section of the Article rather than under a section entitled
"Venue"? Because venue is an essential element of the State's case,
when the State fails to offer any evidence of venue at a jury trial, the
State has failed to prove venue. Therefore, the State's evidence was
insufficient to convict.
The State argued on appeal that venue was established when
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his denial of bond. In
that motion defendant asserted that he had been a resident of Houston
County all his life, and that his business, where one of the crimes was
alleged to have occurred, was in Houston County. The court of appeals
accepted the State's argument,7 5 but the supreme court reversed,
concluding that the court of appeals "failed to conduct37 6a proper
sufficiency review" by considering facts not found by a jury.
In another insufficient evidence case, Everritt v. State,3 71 the Georgia
Supreme Court considered this question: "Can one who enters a
successful conspiracy to commit arson be held criminally responsible for
the murder of one co-conspirator by another, when the murder was
committed months after the arson in order to keep the conspiracy
secret?" 8 A conspiracy exists when two or more people join together
to pursue a common criminal plan. 379 The criminal culpability of each
conspirator "extends not only to what is done by any of the conspirators

371. Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518-19, 591 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2004).
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374. Id. at 103, 586 S.E.2d at 232-33.
375. Id. at 102-03, 586 S.E.2d at 232.
376. Id. at 104, 586 S.E.2d at 233.
377. 277 Ga. 457, 588 S.E.2d 691 (2003).
378. Id. at 457, 588 S.E.2d at 691-92.
379. Id. at 459, 588 S.E.2d at 693 (citing Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 514, 216 S.E.2d
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pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incident to
and growing out of the original purpose."3 °
In Everritt Ray Everritt hired John McDuffie to burn down Everritt's
gas station for the insurance money. Everritt promised to pay McDuffie
out of the insurance proceeds when he received them. McDuffie, after
one failed attempt, offered Cox $1500 to do the job, and Cox burned the
station down. When Everritt was not paid right away from the
insurance proceeds, Everitt was unable to pay McDuffie, who in turn
could not pay Cox. Cox began complaining to friends that McDuffie
owed him money for burning down Everritt's gas station. McDuffie, who
was not happy about this, lured Cox into his shop and killed him with
an ax. McDuffie and his grandson then dumped Cox's body in the
woods. Everritt gave McDuffie a new set of tires so that tire tracks
could not be traced to his truck, which he had used to dump the body.
The jury convicted Everritt for conspiracy to commit murder, and the
court gave him a life sentence.3"'
The supreme court reversed, holding that "a conspiracy to commit
arson, without more, does not naturally, necessarily, and probably result
in the murder of one co-conspirator by another."3"2 There was no
evidence at all that Everritt conspired to kill Cox. The tire incident
occurred after the murder and could only prove that Everritt was a party
to murder after the fact, but to be a conspirator, Everitt had to have
been involved before the fact.3" 3 The court rejected the State's argument that the murder was done in furtherance of the conspiracy by
helping to conceal it because there was no evidence that this was
reasonably foreseen by Everritt when he agreed to commit arson with
McDuffie. 3"
Because the court reversed for insufficient evidence,
Everritt cannot ever be retried.38 5
X.

CONCLUSION

We are criminal defense lawyers. We understand and respect the role
prosecuting attorneys play in the administration of criminal justice. We
hope that all lawyers, whether or not they practice criminal law,
whether they prosecute or defend, appreciate the precious liberties
guaranteed to us all by the federal and state constitutions. The courts,
as each of these cases above illustrate in some measure, strive to achieve
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that delicate balance whereby the state, on the one side, can maintain
the peace, good order, and dignity of our communities, while the accused
citizen, on the other, can be assured that no one, not even the state with
all its power, can take away his freedom without first providing what we
have come to call "due process," a phrase imbued with the lessons of
hundreds of years of struggle.

